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Originally Posted by schrocat

The abuse was described in an FBI report. Not a shadowy liberal website.

There you go again, quoting from one of those "liberial biasness" FBI reports. Everybody knows the FBI is a den of liberals. How else would you explain the instructions issued by the FBI Director to his agents that they should step out of the interrogation room whenever the CIA enters?

Last year, Federal Bureau of Investigation director Robert Mueller said CIA interrogation techniques "violate all American anti-torture laws," and instructed FBI agents to step outside of the room when the CIA steps in.

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Originally Posted by schrocat

"We saw no evidence of mistreatment, nor would one expect to on a planned visit. We didn't talk to detainees, rules prevent it, but the Red Cross does. They have unfettered access."


So I would guess a Red Cross assesment could be a pretty good gauge.

The ICRC has access to acknowledged detention centers and even at those, detainees have been shuffled around to keep them away from the ICRC team. That's according to an official U.S. Army investigative report but it was probably written by a liberal general.

Tell the Red Cross to visit Diego Garcia. Oh, that's right, they' can't.

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Analysts say there are at least a score of unacknowledged facilities around the world. Among them, several in Afghanistan (one known as "the pit") and Iraq, in Pakistan, Jordan, in a restricted unit at Guantanamo, and one, they suspect, on Diego Garcia, where two navy prison ships ferry prisoners in and out.

This week, the United Nations said it will investigate a number of allegations from reliable sources that the U.S. is detaining terrorist suspects in undeclared holding facilities, including on board ships believed to be in the Indian Ocean.

"Diego Garcia is an obvious place for a secret facility," says American defence analyst John Pike. "They want somewhere that's difficult to escape from, difficult to attack, not visible to prying eyes and where a lot of other activity is going on. Diego Garcia is ideal."

The British government has flatly denied detainees are being held covertly on the island. When asked last year, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state Lawrence DiRita didn't deny it outright, saying only, "I don't know. I simply don't know."

What is known about CIA activities is that, since 2001, the agency has been transferring or "rendering" suspects to third countries for aggressive interrogation.


That's from the Toronto Star but, as everyone knows, all Canadians are liberals.

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Gen. Anthony Zinni, USMC, (Ret.) Remarks at CDI Board of Directors Dinner, May 12, 2004

"I just came back from giving a lecture at UCLA yesterday, and the lecture was on the Middle East. I tried to ... for the students there, step back and take a more strategic view of the Middle East and the issues out there and maybe give them a perception of the problems and issues from the eyes of those that live with it day-to-day, the Arabs, Israelis, all those that make up the peoples of the Middle East.



On the way back I was thinking about what to talk about here and I know Iraq is a hot topic and I thought I would stay with Iraq. And I thought on the airplane about how history is going to record what happened in Iraq, how we got into it, and obviously it's too early to tell. And oftentimes the outcome defines how history characterizes it.



But I thought about how much has been misconstrued about what has happened so far, especially at a time when I commanded CENTCOM and we were in the process of containing Iraq as part of the policy. And I thought about the mistakes we made, that as Bruce (Blair, President of CDI) said, I've commented on before.



And what I thought I would do tonight is go through the ten crucial mistakes to this point that we've made. Because I think it helps frame what, in fact, has happened over time ... and is going to be the first part of that history. And I will conclude with maybe some thoughts on the way ahead, at least from my point of view.



I think the first mistake that was made was misjudging the success of containment. I heard the president say, not too long ago, I believe it was with the interview with Tim Russert that ... I'm not sure ... but at some point I heard him say that "containment did not work." That's not true.



I was responsible, along with everybody from General Schwarzkopf to his two successors, that were my predecessors, myself, and my successor, General Franks, up until the war, we were responsible for containment. And I would like to explain a little bit about that containment, because I thought we did it pretty well, given the circumstances. And it began with Bush 41 accepting the UN resolution to conduct the war, staying within the framework of the UN resolution, and not after the war, going to Baghdad, breaking the coalition, ending up inheriting a country that I think he clearly saw would be a burden on us, our military, our treasure, and would break relations around the region, and would put him outside what he considered his international legitimacy for doing this - the resolution by which he operated and conducted the war, and the resolution by which we established the sanctions.



Administering those sanctions was done pretty effectively I thought. In the entire U.S. Central Command, in my time there, on any given day we had less troops in the entire region than show up to work at the Pentagon any morning. Think about that. Soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, carriers, squadrons, battalions. On any given day ... on an average day in CENTCOM, we had about 23,000 troops, soup to nuts. Logistics, fighters ... and we ran that with these 23,000 troops, the whole region. To top it off, those troops were not assigned to CENTCOM. In other words, that structure wasn't created to be part of CENTCOM, like the troops are in the Pacific Command or in the European Command, these were troops that were on rotation. They came from other places, from the United States, from Europe, from the Pacific region. And they rotated through. Ships rotated through, battalions came in and out, squadrons came in and out. So we never created a structure. We did it with borrowed troops, so we could up the rheostat or lower it when we needed to.



It was in my view, what we would call in the military, an "economy of force theatre" without these assigned forces. We had no American bases out there. We were sharing bases with allies in the region who provided for us. Any given year, those in the region ponied up $300-500 million to support our presence out there. What we called "assistance in-kind." They provided the fuel, the food, the water, the things we needed. The Saudis built a $240 million housing complex for our troops. Never once when we decided to take action against Saddam, when he violated the sanctions, or the rules by which the inspectors operated under, never once were we denied permission to use bases, or airspace, or to strike from those places. We built a wonderful coalition, without any formal treaties, without any particular arrangement.



During that time, when we asked allies in that region to join us in other conflicts, like Somalia, they came. Egyptians came. Pakistanis came. The Saudis came. The Kuwaitis came. The Emirates came and provided forces. They joined us in the Balkans. They joined us elsewhere on operations when we needed them. We ran the largest military exercises in the world ... in this part of the world. In Egypt we did "Bright Star." We built a magnificent coalition of forces, without ever once signing a piece of paper. And we contained Saddam. We watched his military shrink to less than half its size from the beginning of the Gulf War until the time I left command, not only shrinking in size, but dealing with obsolete equipment, ill-trained troops, dissatisfaction in the ranks, a lot of absenteeism. We didn't see the Iraqis as a formidable force. We saw them as a decaying force.



We couldn't account for all the weapons of mass destruction. The inspectors that were in there had to assume that the weapons of mass destruction that were in his original inventory that we could not account for, might still be there. So that was always a planning factor. But when you look hard at that, these were artillery shells, rocket rounds, that he would have to be hiding somewhere that were getting old. And if he had to bring them out and use them, think about this, he's got to move them to artillery positions, to battery positions, under total dominance of the air by the United States. I sure as hell wouldn't have been ... want to be that battery commander that said tomorrow you're going to get five truckloads of chemical weapons to be stored in your area to shoot. Not under the air power we brought down and the ability to interdict them. And these were tactical capabilities.



Much has been made, which confuses me, about unmanned aerial vehicles. We monitored the L-29 program ... a trainer that he was trying to put tanks on. Never once in my experience did he ever fly it unmanned. He usually crashed it even manned. And in order to even hit Kuwait, he would have to bring it into the no-fly zone and launch it from an air base where we didn't allow aircraft to fly from, and we would have taken it out -- preemptively.



We bombed him almost at will. No one in the region felt threatened by Saddam. No one in the region denied us our ability to conduct sanctions. Many countries joined us in sanctions enforcement, in the no-fly zones, and in the maritime intercept operations where we attempted to intercept his oil and gas smuggling.



So to say containment didn't work, I think is not only wrong from the experiences we had then, but the proof is in the pudding, in what kind of military our troops faced when we went in there. It disintegrated in front of us. It didn't have the capabilities, that were pumped up, that were supposedly possessed by this military. And I think that will be the first mistake that will be recorded in history, the belief that containment as a policy doesn't work. It certainly worked against the Soviet Union, has worked with North Korea and others. It's not a pleasant thing to have to administer, it requires troops full-time, there are moments when there ... there are periods of violence, but containment is a lot cheaper than the alternative, as we're finding out now. So I think that will be mistake number one: discounting the effectiveness of the containment.



A side note on that. The process of containment created an "alliance," which I would put in quotation marks, in the region. We located our forces in all six GCC, Gulf Cooperation Council countries. When we deployed, we made sure that we got everybody in the region pregnant when we acted, and deployed, and enforced sanctions. We deliberately put our troops in positions and operating out of bases where everybody had to make a political commitment. That was the rule and everybody understood it. And we built an arrangement out there, a security arrangement, through the enforcement of those sanctions, that I think helped us create stability. I think we made a mistake in not capitalizing on that. I think the Clinton doctrine and policy of engagement was right, but we never really got the resources or authority to do it to its fullest extent. I think there was a reluctant Congress to provide those kinds of resources, but that would have been cheaper by half. The idea to regionalize our problems and allow us to build the forces within a region that can deal with these problems, I think is a much more powerful idea. We could have done that in Africa, we could have done that in the Middle East, in Central Asia, and elsewhere.



The second mistake I think history will record is that the strategy was flawed. I couldn't believe what I was hearing about the benefits of this strategic move. That the road to Jerusalem led through Baghdad, when just the opposite is true, the road to Baghdad led through Jerusalem. You solve the Middle East peace process, you'd be surprised what kinds of others things will work out.



The idea that we will walk in and be met with open arms. The idea that we will have people that will glom on to democracy overnight. The idea that strategically we will reform, reshape, and change the Middle East by this action -- we've changed it all right.



So we had a basic flawed strategy. All those that believed this was going to be the catalyst for some kind of positive change out there, or some sort of revolutionary change in the region, I think got more than they bargained for, and didn't understand the region, the culture, the situation, and the issues, and the effect that what they were about to do was going to have on those.



The third mistake, I think was one we repeated from Vietnam, we had to create a false rationale for going in to get public support. The books were cooked, in my mind. The intelligence was not there. I testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee one month before the war, and Senator Lugar asked me: "General Zinni, do you feel the threat from Saddam Hussein is imminent?" I said: "No, not at all. It was not an imminent threat. Not even close. Not grave, gathering, imminent, serious, severe, mildly upsetting, none of those."



I predicted that the fighting would be over, the organized resistance in three weeks. To Tommy Franks' credit, he did it in 19 days. He beat my prediction. He did a magnificent job, as did our troops. But the rationale that we faced an imminent threat, or a serious threat, was ridiculous. Now, wherever history lays that, whether the intelligence was flawed or it was exaggerated, remains to be seen. I have my own opinions.



We failed in number four, to internationalize the effort. To the credit of President Bush 41, he set a standard that held up throughout the post-cold war period up until the Iraq war very well. He went to the United Nations before we undertook the operation to expel Saddam from Kuwait. Tremendous diplomatic effort to get a resolution from the United Nations to authorize the use of force and then a tremendous diplomatic effort on his part to create what I think is one of the most remarkable coalitions, the coalition we had in the Gulf war, where we had Arab countries, Islamic countries, European countries, contributions from the Far East all over the world. That model was extremely successful, and if you think about it, every intervention we had since we used the model, and it worked. We did it in Somalia, in Haiti, in Bosnia, in Kosovo, East Timor, there were variations on it, but it always started with that UN resolution.



Where we felt that we had to lead because we were the only ones that could do it, or it was in our vital national interests, we led. But we had magnificent coalitions. When I was in Somalia, we had to cut off the number of contributing countries in the phase that we led to 26, we had 44 commitments when we had to say, "Enough! The law of diminishing returns is setting in here in Somalia." In East Timor, the Australians took the lead, and we supported it. But again it was the international authority, the international legitimacy given to us by that UN resolution. And if you think about it, every time we were successful, not only did we get the UN resolution that we needed for the Gulf War, we got it again in '93 and in '98 when we needed to use force, we got the authorization in the wording we needed during the enforcement of the sanctions to use force.



Why would we believe that we would not get it this time? Why would we believe that this time for some reason, unlike before, the inspectors would not call the shots honestly? The inspectors don't make judgments they just make reports of facts. We have Americans on inspection teams. Ralph Ekeus, Richard Butler, they always came across with an honest assessment of what was happening. Why, suddenly, wasMohamed El Baradei and Hans Blix suspect? And what was the rush to war?



I think the fifth mistake was that we underestimated the task. And I think those of us that knew that region, former commanders in chief, I guess we can't use that term anymore - part of transformation is to change the lexicon - but former combatant commanders of U.S. Central Command, beginning with Gen. Schwarzkopf, have said you don't understand what you're getting into. You are not going to go through Edelman's "cakewalk;" you are not going to go through Chalabi's dancing in the streets to receive you. You are about to go into a problem that you don't know the dimensions and the depth of, and are going to cause you a great deal of pain, time, expenditure of resources and casualties down the road.



I can't understand why there was an underestimation when you look at a country that has never known democracy, that has been in the condition it's been in, that has the natural fault lines that it has, and the issues it has. And to look at the task of reconstructing this country, not only reconstructing it, but the idea of creating Jeffersonian democracy almost overnight, is almost ridiculous, in concept, in the kind of time and effort that was given as an estimate as to what it would take.



The sixth mistake, and maybe the biggest one, was propping up and trusting the exiles, the infamous "Gucci Guerillas" from London. We bought into their intelligence reports. To the credit of the CIA, they didn't buy into it, so I guess the Defense Department created its own boutique intelligence agency to vet them. And we ended up with a group that fed us bad information. That led us to believe that we would be welcomed with flowers in the streets; that led us to believe that this would be a cakewalk.



When I testified before Congress in 1998, after a grilling from Senator McCain and all those wonderful senators supported the Iraqi Liberation Act, and I told them that these guys are not credible and they are going to lead us into something they we will regret. At that time, they were pushing a plan that Central Command would supply air support and special forces, and we would put it into Iraq, and they would pied piper their way up to Baghdad and the whole place would fall apart. This plan was created by two senate staffers and a retired General. I happened to be the commander of central command, nobody bothered to ask me about how my troops would be used. And they were a little bit upset about me being upset about this. These exiles did not have credibility inside the country or in the region. Not only did they not have credibility, it was clear that the information they were providing us many times was not correct and accurate. We believed in them. We also brought them in with us and deemed them into the governing council and the reception by Iraqis has been, to say the least, has not been great.



The seventh problem has been the lack of planning. I testified again during that period with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, right behind the panel of planners from the State Department and the Department of Defense, and I listened to them describe a "plan." I understood and knew that Gen. Franks and CENTCOM, would do their part. I knew damn right well the security piece would be taken care of, and I knew we had a good plan. I didn't hear anything that told me that they had the scope of planning for the political reconstruction, the economic reconstruction, social reconstruction, the development of building of infrastructure for that country. And I think that lack of planning, that idea that you can do this by the seat of the pants, reconstruct a country, to make decisions on the fly, to beam in on the side that has to that political, economic, social other parts, just a handful of people at the last minute to be able to do it was patently ridiculous.



In my time at CENTCOM, we actually looked at a plan for reconstruction, and actually developed one at CENTCOM because I though that we, the military, would get stuck with it. In my mind, we needed formidable teams at every provincial level. 18 teams. The size of the CPA was about the size we felt we needed for one province, let alone the entire country of Baghad [sic] (Iraq), to do those other parts.



The eighth problem was the insufficiency of military forces on the ground. There were a lot more troops in my military plan for operations in Iraq. I know when that plan was presented, the secretary of defense said it was "old and stale." It sounded pretty new and fresh to me, and looking back at it, now because there were a hell of a lot more troops. It was more the (Eric) Shinseki model that I think might have been a hell of a lot more effective to freeze the situation. Those extra divisions we had in there were not to defeat the Republican Guard, they were in there to freeze the security situation because we knew the chaos that would result once we uprooted an authoritarian regime like Saddam's.



The ninth problem has been the ad hoc organization we threw in there. No one can tell me the Coalition Provisional Authority had any planning for its structure. 144 bodies scraped from embassies around the world, people that I know, for fact, walked in and were selected and picked and put in the positions. Never quite fully manned-up until well into the operation. Never the kinds of qualifications or the breadth, and scope and depth it needed to work the problems down to the grassroots level. Changing horses in mid-stream, General Garner, I guess we can't say that he's fired. I found out tonight from Mark Thompson that the Defense Department claims he wasn't fired. But Jay Garner leaves, and in comes Jerry Bremer, third quarter, you're down seven, bring in the back-up quarterback and part of his job is to create the game plan while he's out there.



And that ad hoc organization has failed, leading to the tenth mistake, and that's a series of bad decisions on the ground. De-Baathifying down to a point where you've alienated the Sunnis, where you have stopped having qualified people down in the ranks, people who don't have blood on their hands, but know how to make the trains run on time. Business men who I ran into in the region out there in the region, who wanted to re-start their business, get jobs. They were told by the CPA "You can't do business because you were a Baathist!" They said to me, I had to say I was a Baathist. You don't do business in Iraq under Saddam if you're not a Baathist. Imagine throwing the Communists out of Russia at the end of the war.



Disbanding the Army, this is one I'll never understand because when I arrived at CENTCOM as the commander, there was an on-going program started by my predecessors to run a psychological operations campaign against the regular Army. Every time we struck Iraq, we dropped leaflets on regular Army formations and garrisons saying "If you don't fight when the time comes, we'll take care of you." We sent messages to them to this affect through people in the region. When I did interviews on Al Jazeera TV and other Arab networks, I would always mention the poor Iraqi soldiers of the regular Army - victims of Saddam. We had always intended if they didn't fight, we'd get rid of the leadership, we'd keep them in tact, we'd provide for some of their training, and we would have the basis for a ready-made force to pick up some of the security requirements. But they were disbanded. And on and on and on, we've had this series of mistakes. Lack of a dialogue or identification of the leadership in the Sunni and the Shia areas. The inability to connect with the leadership down there. Somebody like Sistani who doesn't even talk to Jerry Bremer - I don't think they've ever had a conversation, he refuses to see him. We have now found ourselves in a position to date for these series of mistakes and many, many more, where we are. Which I think is clearly evident.



Almost every week, somebody calls me up, if it's not Mark Thompson it's somebody else, and says "What would you do now?" You know, there's a rule that if you find yourself in hole, stop digging. The first thing I would say is we need to stop digging. We have dug this hole so deep now that you see many serious people, Jack Murtha, General Odom, and others beginning to say it's time to just pull out, cut your losses. I'm not of that camp. Not yet. But I certainly think we've come pretty close to that.



I would do several things now. But clearly the first and most important thing you need is that UN resolution. That's been the model since the end of the Cold War, that has given us the basis and has given our allies the basis for joining us and helping us and provided the legitimacy we need.



We can't keep dropping paper on the UN, it's time for a group of adults, called the Perm Five, the permanent five members of the Security Council, to sit down and come up with some agreeable, mutually developed UN resolution that would allow other countries now to participate. And I think there are many out there at different levels, especially in the region, that would want to participate and help and before it comes too tough and too costly, we need to get them in. It will probably mean some of these Perm Five members and others will want to have a say in the political reconstruction and economic reconstruction, but so what?



If we create a free economy in Iraq, someday, probably sooner that later, some oil minister is going to cut a contract with the French. Guess what? That's inevitable. So why not start up front, admitting that. We need the UN resolution, that's the number one priority.



After getting that, I would first go to the countries in the region asking their help. I would do things like ask the countries to give us five or six officers for each of our battalions and regiments and brigades and above, five or six Arab officers that have attended our schools. For each of those units, that have gone to our command and general staff colleges, that not only speak English but know us, and we know them. And I'd put them on the planning staffs of these units, as advisors, as planners. If I'm a battalion commander down there in the middle of Fallujah or Najaf, I need more than some kid who happens to be of Arab descent and speaks Arabic that I drug over there and probably doesn't speak the dialect. I would like to have five or six of these guys that I went to school with, that I know, that would be there, that would be seconded there for me as planners, advisors, and to help me in these situations.

I would ask these countries in the region to allow us to build camps along the borders of Iraq, to train police, border security, and Army. I would lure the young men into these positions by considerable pay for what they are about to do, and they would deserve it. I would ask the Europeans and the others to help us build a training program, one that would last a long time, maybe even a year, to develop truly competent security forces with high morale, organizational coherence, the equipment and the pay that would make them proud. It may mean we're going to have to gut it out for a while. But it means that we have at least an end-state where we are going to put credible security forces and Iraqi forces on the ground. I would ask those countries that can commit those forces to help us, not only in patrolling cities that may be casualty traps, but in securing the borders.



There is a Ho Chi Minh trail here. Somewhere, somehow people are getting in the jihadis. I don't believe the Iraqis are blowing themselves up. They're coming from outside. We have insufficient forces to protect borders. I can't believe that we control all the major routes in and out from Kuwait and Jordan, when everyday I see another IED, improvised explosive device, blow up another fuel convoy coming down that road. Forces that protect road networks - that isn't a casualty intensive or difficult task - those are the kinds of forces under a UN agreement, that I think we can get in there to perform those missions, to use the Powell doctrine and putting some overwhelming force on the critical nodes, and the critical routes, and the critical infrastructure we need to protect. I would hold a conference somewhere in the region, ask the Arabs to sponsor it, although I would provide support.



I would invite every Iraqi business man I can convince to come, and I would invite foreign investors, and I would ask them to come together, hold this conference over a period of weeks, to define what these business men need to establish their business, to make it grow, to re-establish it, to protect it, the kind of investment they need, the infrastructure, but the key is jobs, jobs, jobs. Jobs for Iraqis. I would go to the contractors in there, and say, I don't want to see truck drivers that are coming from Peoria, Illinois. I want to pay truck drivers that are Iraqis. It doesn't take a hell of a lot of talent to drive a truck. Why aren't Iraqis driving trucks for their own reconstruction and redevelopment? Why are people from outside coming in, where they have no investment in protecting and providing for the security and the movement of those goods?

The Halliburtons and Bechtels and, and others ought to be encouraged to hire locally, unless there is a skills set that isn't present there. But I almost can't believe that you couldn't find that in there. I think we need to start talking about the kind of government we're going to eventually have in this nation. Is it a confederation? A federation? What kind of local autonomy are the Shi'a, the Kurds, the Sunnis, going to have? What will be the status of Baghdad? No one has talked about that structure publicly. We're about to turn this over to some interim council and we're heading towards, six months from now, an election; an election where the electorate is educated on how to vote Friday prayers from the pulpit.



There's no system of education for the electorate. There are no political parties that I see and have been developed openly - there are certainly some growing that I would be suspicious of. And I think that unless we come to grips with the form of government, unless we work openly and in a transparent manner to develop political parties, and this has to be under international UN supervision, and unless we run a program of education for the electorate, we're not going to like the results we see by the end of January when the supposed elections are going to take place.



Those are just a few ideas. But I think it takes quality people on the ground to be able to implement these, it takes international authority and not the U.S. stamp on it, because that's not acceptable anymore. It's going to be a period of time where we're going to have to bear the burden of the most severe security responsibilities. But we ought to at least plan for a time when we can turn that over, and at least share some of the less demanding security experiences and variances. And I'm convinced that if we open this up and get the UN resolution, there will be those that will come in and stand by our side, boot-to-boot, on some of the tougher missions.

We also have to stop the tough talk rhetoric. One thing you learn in this business is, don't say it unless you're going to do it. In this part of the world, strength matters. And if you say you are going to go in and wipe them out, you better do it. If you say you're going to do it and then you back off and find another solution, you have lost face. And we have got to stop the kind of bravado and talk that only leads us into trouble out there. We need to be more serious and more mature in what we project as an image. Our whole public relations effort out there has been a disaster. I read the newspapers from the region every night online, and if you watch Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, or even some of the more moderate stations out there, and you read the editorials in the newspaper, there is a different war being portrayed in that region. A different conflict than we're getting from Fox, CNN, CBS, et cetera. And we better get the two jibed somehow, because that has been a massive failure. And there again, we could use advice from the region as to how to go about it. Thank you for you attention. I'd be glad to take any questions you may have."


http://www.cdi.org/program/document....e=../index.cfm

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Pentagon Contradicts General on Iraq Occupation Force's Size

By Eric Schmitt

New York Times
February 28, 2003


In a contentious exchange over the costs of war with Iraq, the Pentagon's second-ranking official today disparaged a top Army general's assessment of the number of troops needed to secure postwar Iraq. House Democrats then accused the Pentagon official, Paul D. Wolfowitz, of concealing internal administration estimates on the cost of fighting and rebuilding the country.

Mr. Wolfowitz, the deputy defense secretary, opened a two-front war of words on Capitol Hill, calling the recent estimate by Gen. Eric K. Shinseki of the Army that several hundred thousand troops would be needed in postwar Iraq, "wildly off the mark." Pentagon officials have put the figure closer to 100,000 troops. Mr. Wolfowitz then dismissed articles in several newspapers this week asserting that Pentagon budget specialists put the cost of war and reconstruction at $60 billion to $95 billion in this fiscal year. He said it was impossible to predict accurately a war's duration, its destruction and the extent of rebuilding afterward.

"We have no idea what we will need until we get there on the ground," Mr. Wolfowitz said at a hearing of the House Budget Committee. "Every time we get a briefing on the war plan, it immediately goes down six different branches to see what the scenarios look like. If we costed each and every one, the costs would range from $10 billion to $100 billion." (We're over $200 billion right now and closing in on $300 billion.) Mr. Wolfowitz's refusal to be pinned down on the costs of war and peace in Iraq infuriated some committee Democrats, who noted that Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and Mitchell E. Daniels Jr., the budget director, had briefed President Bush on just such estimates on Tuesday.

"I think you're deliberately keeping us in the dark," said Representative James P. Moran, Democrat of Virginia. "We're not so naïve as to think that you don't know more than you're revealing." Representative Darlene Hooley, an Oregon Democrat, also voiced exasperation with Mr. Wolfowitz: "I think you can do better than that."

Mr. Wolfowitz, with Dov S. Zakheim, the Pentagon comptroller, at his side, tried to mollify the Democratic lawmakers, promising to fill them in eventually on the administration's internal cost estimates. "There will be an appropriate moment," he said, when the Pentagon would provide Congress with cost ranges. "We're not in a position to do that right now."

At a Pentagon news conference with President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan, Mr. Rumsfeld echoed his deputy's comments. Neither Mr. Rumsfeld nor Mr. Wolfowitz mentioned General Shinseki, the Army chief of staff, by name. But both men were clearly irritated at the general's suggestion that a postwar Iraq might require many more forces than the 100,000 American troops and the tens of thousands of allied forces that are also expected to join a reconstruction effort.

"The idea that it would take several hundred thousand U.S. forces I think is far off the mark," Mr. Rumsfeld said. General Shinseki gave his estimate in response to a question at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Tuesday: "I would say that what's been mobilized to this point — something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers — are probably, you know, a figure that would be required." He also said that the regional commander, Gen. Tommy R. Franks, would determine the precise figure.

A spokesman for General Shinseki, Col. Joe Curtin, said today that the general stood by his estimate. "He was asked a question and he responded with his best military judgment," Colonel Curtin said. General Shinseki is a former commander of the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia.

In his testimony, Mr. Wolfowitz ticked off several reasons why he believed a much smaller coalition peacekeeping force than General Shinseki envisioned would be sufficient to police and rebuild postwar Iraq. He said there was no history of ethnic strife in Iraq, as there was in Bosnia or Kosovo. He said Iraqi civilians would welcome an American-led liberation force that "stayed as long as necessary but left as soon as possible," but would oppose a long-term occupation force. And he said that nations that oppose war with Iraq would likely sign up to help rebuild it. "I would expect that even countries like France will have a strong interest in assisting Iraq in reconstruction," Mr. Wolfowitz said. (The Bush administration later announced that only companies from those countries who actively supported the coalition would be allowed to participate in the rebuilding of Iraq.) He added that many Iraqi expatriates would likely return home to help.

In the 1991 Persian Gulf War, many nations agreed in advance of hostilities to help pay for a conflict that eventually cost about $61 billion. Mr. Wolfowitz said that this time around the administration was dealing with "countries that are quite frightened of their own shadows" in assembling a coalition to force President Saddam Hussein to disarm.

Enlisting countries to help to pay for this war and its aftermath would take more time, he said. "I expect we will get a lot of mitigation, but it will be easier after the fact than before the fact," Mr. Wolfowitz said. Mr. Wolfowitz spent much of the hearing knocking down published estimates of the costs of war and rebuilding, saying the upper range of $95 billion was too high, and that the estimates were almost meaningless because of the variables. Moreover, he said such estimates, and speculation that postwar reconstruction costs could climb even higher, ignored the fact that Iraq is a wealthy country, with annual oil exports worth $15 billion to $20 billion. "To assume we're going to pay for it all is just wrong," he said. At the Pentagon, Mr. Rumsfeld said the factors influencing cost estimates made even ranges imperfect. Asked whether he would release such ranges to permit a useful public debate on the subject, Mr. Rumsfeld said, "I've already decided that. It's not useful."


I have added my own little comments and highlighted the more hilarious statements by the civilian geniuses at the Pentagon in charge of planning Operation Iraqi Freedom. I particularly like Wolfie's comment that there is no history of ethnic strife in Iraq. And to think, these are the guys who were in charge of planning this fiasco.

P.S. -- Gen. Shinseki was the highest ranking officer in the Army at the time of his testimony. He was Chief of Staff. He retired shortly thereafter.

[Ninong]

Uncle Karl warned us about people like Gen. Shinseki and Gen. Zinni and anyone else who would dare to question the administration's conduct of the war on terror. (Notice that the war to remove WMD from Iraq is now called the War on Terror. Especially now that we have lured all of the terrorists from the entire Middle East to Iraq.)

I can see why Pres. Bush (the younger) decided to put a nice neo-con like Wolfowitz in charge of planning Operation Iraqi Freedom. Letting anyone with actual military experience handle such a delicate political task would have been a big mistake. But somehow I wish he had consulted with his daddy before doing that. But, no, he never talks about stuff like that with his father. He answers to "a higher Father."

Bush (the elder) could have told him that Wolfowitz is a bit extreme, to put it mildly. In 1989, Bush (the elder) appointed Wolfowitz Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Pentagon's third-ranking post.

In 1992 the neo-conservative Wolfowitz authored a policy document, entitled 'Defense Planning Guidance' to 'set the nation's direction for the next century' that President George Bush Sr. regarded as too controversial and ordered Dick Cheney to rewrite.

In March 2001, Wolfowitz was appointed the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Pentagon’s number two post by Bush (the younger).

He did such a bang-up job at the Pentagon that last month they sent him over to the World Bank to see what he can do there. That should be interesting.

[schrocat]

http://www.warblogging.com/archives/000220.php

2002?

Maybe the thread should be updated in light of the FBI report and the Red Cross.
I'd add a "where are they now" comment in the warblog thread but it's so old it 404's.


...maybe the date is wrong.

[Ninong]

Originally Posted by schrocat

http://www.warblogging.com/archives/000220.php

2002?

Maybe the thread should be updated in light of the FBI report and the Red Cross.
I'd add a "where are they now" comment in the warblog thread but it's so old it 404's.


...maybe the date is wrong.

I guess you would have to ask him if he has changed his opinion in the past 3-1/2 years or not. Probably not.

Horologium is a blogger. He says he's single, in his mid-30's and serves with the Armed Forces somewhere in the Pacific Northwest. He doesn't give his rank. He doesn't say if he's on active duty or in the reserves.

Here's his picture:

[Ninong]

In some ways, the new Iraq may be similar to the old Iraq: http://observer.guardian.co.uk/inter...520136,00.html


Iraqi government admits its troops are engaging in torture: http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L03428937.htm

[WHOSYOURDADDY]

Let me ask schrocat this question What the heck is NNS?

What does Iragi interagation methods have to do with alledged torture in US Facilities?

Schrocat who mentioned anything about a "Visitors Center"?

Under what command does does Gitmo jurisdiction fall under?

FYI I highlighted the warblogger and the Mirror to show that even British Tabloids had to agree that there is no evidence of torture. Since 2002, what has changed?

Question, what is your definition of "Abuse"?

[Ninong]

Originally Posted by WHOSYOURDADDY

What does Iragi interagation methods have to do with alledged torture in US Facilities?

Did you read the opening post in this thread: Why can't they make up their minds?

The thread was opened as a discussion of the Vice President's contention that the insurgency in Iraq is in its "last throes." That covers a lot of territory.

Under what command does does Gitmo jurisdiction fall under?

What is this a quiz?

Guantanamo is under U.S. Southern Command. Are you asking because you didn't know?

P.S. -- In case you didn't know, all of the DAIG Detainee Inspection Reports for JTF Guantanamo are available online.

[WHOSYOURDADDY]

Hey bright guy - before you pump out your holier than thou attitude I know better than you because I am a California liberial - it makes sense to gauge whom you are speaking with.


FYI - I work for the DOD out of Norfolk VA. I have been to Gitmo and seen the facilities. Have you? I have seen the classified video's and reports that are not published online or CNN Have you?

So when I speak about my opinion(s) I don't speak about 3rd party as you seem to do. I make my opinions based on 1st hand knowledge of what I see. Do you?

So, what next smart guy? You going to continue to use your liberal declassifed material to continue for your administration bashing. It seems that based on what I have just read you really don't have a clue about what your talking about (makes sense living on the west coast), simple a megaphone of liberal proproganda.

FYI - Gitmo (Cuba) falls directly under the Atlantic Command out of Norfolk, VA all communications are routed through Norfolk flights to and from Gitmo come out of Chambers Field Norfolk. Countries like Haiti fall under the Southern Command and are supported by Norfolk.

Southern Command History

The Commander, United States Naval Forces Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) was established in February 2000, with headquarters at Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico which in early 2004 relocated to Naval Station Mayport, Florida. COMUSNAVSO serves as a main link between the U.S. Navy and the navies of South America, Central America, and the Caribbean, and is at the forefront of U.S. engagement in the Western Hemisphere. The command consolidates functions previously conducted by the Commander, Western Hemisphere Group, formerly in Mayport, Florida and the Commander, South Atlantic Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet (COMSOLANT), formerly located at Naval Station Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico. COMUSNAVSO was built around the core of COMSOLANT, that was established in June of 1958 with headquarters in Trinidad and Tobago and was moved to Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico in 1973. COMSOLANT had participated in annual "UNITAS" deployments around South America since 1960, and routinely deployed to Africa for the West African Training Cruise since 1980.

Personally, I have been Roosevelt Roads, and Gitmo the Southern Command falls under the U.S. Atlantic Fleet (COMSOLANT) based out of Norfolk VA.

This is why I asked the question obviously you only got part of the answer correct. Like your postings just enough to justify your position and not the whole truth and if it was a quiz you would have failed

Which is what you do best, is it not - push your liberal political agenda - as I stated to you privately - enjoy being the party in the minority. Before you try to correct me make sure you got your facts straight.

[schrocat]

umm...

Norfolk Naval Station (which is the HQ Command) for GITMO and open your eyes...

also, if a civilian went there I was imagining they would only be able to go to the visitors center.

No offense but you don't really strike me as anyone with better first hand info than an FBI report...a point you continusly ignore wherupon you seem to ask again "where is this info".

and again no offense, but i'm sure a lot of people have done things like...delivering equipment or whatever to some of these facilities and could also say "I've been there...I saw nothing" and be entirely correct.

[Ninong]

All of the news releases from Brigadier General Jay Hood, commander of Joint Task Force Guantanamo, come out of SOUTHCOM. His email address is @jtfgtmo.southcom.mil which is why I assumed that Guantanamo was part of SOUTHCOM.

And, according to SOUTHCOM's website, Joint Task Force Guantanamo is a component of SOUTHCOM: http://www.southcom.mil/pa/Components/Compmain.htm

[schrocat]

Guantanamo is controlled by Southcom.
Camp Delta is controlled by the Joint task force, which is a component of SOUTHCOM.

http://www.jtfgtmo.southcom.mil/index.htm


In what capacity and setting did you watch detainee videos WHOSYOURDADDY?

[Ninong]

Boy, if you thought it was only the administration officials who couldn't make up their minds, you would be sadly mistaken.

Remember "our pal" Iyad Allawi, the former Iraqi Prime Minister that we helped select? The guy who appeared with George Bush at the White House just a few months ago and told us how great we were and how wonderful and safe Baghdad was? The guy who addressed a joint session of Congress?

Why is "our pal" saying such mean things about us now?

IRAQ’S former interim prime minister Iyad Allawi has warned that his country is facing civil war and has predicted dire consequences for Europe and America as well as the Middle East if the crisis is not resolved.

“The problem is that the Americans have no vision and no clear policy on how to go about in Iraq,” said Allawi, a long-time ally of Washington.

Politicians all over the world will say whatever is expedient at the time regardless of the facts. Was he wrong before or is he wrong now? Was he overly optimistic before or is he overly pessimistic now? Maybe he was just being a politician before and is still being a politician.

Obviously things are not going well in Iraq but one would hope that the guys we bought would stay bought.

http://www.rawstory.com/

P.S. -- While we're on the topic of "people we bought," how about that Ahmed Chalabi? We used to give him $300,000/month when he was supplying us with "useful" intel but then we dumped him when he became an embarrassment. Now he's the new Iraqi Oil Minister! How the hell did that happen? And now he's trashing us right and left. I'm sure he had a hand in Iraq's new "understanding" with Iran.